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The introduction of New Apprenticeships in January of 1998 marked an important
initiative in Australia’s efforts to develop a more encompassing system of employ-
ment based vocational education and training. This paper draws on evidence from
case studies of 60 employers to assess the impact of these reforms on training
outcomes and practices. The provisions most enthusiastically embraced by employers
include competency-based assessment and flexibility in time spent in training.
However, these positive indicators of the reform process have not translated into an
improved cost/benefit outcome for employers. Comparison with previous findings
suggests that the net cost of employing trainees has not really changed while the net
cost of apprentices is estimated to be higher than it was in 1996.
Introduction
The introduction of ‘New Apprenticeships’ in January 1998 was an important
policy initiative in Australia’s ongoing efforts to develop a more flexible and
encompassing system of employment-based training and to boost entry-level
vocational education and training (VET) opportunities. The essence of the
New Apprenticeship reforms is to promote structured work based training by
giving employers greater flexibility in how the training is organised. The aim of
this paper is to investigate how these reforms have impacted on the costs and
benefits of training. It is based on case studies of 60 organisations in four
States. The next section of the paper provides a background and overview of
the reforms. It is followed by the findings from the case studies, including
quantitative estimates of the net cost of providing traineeships and appren-
ticeships. The fourth section of the paper discusses the impact of the reforms
with reference to the qualitative findings from the case studies. The final
section contains our concluding comments.1
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The New Apprenticeship Reforms
Increasing the level of VET has been a long held objective of public policy in
Australia. This has seen a steady stream of reforms to the institutional
arrangements for VET. The latest stage of reform has been to subsume
apprenticeships and traineeships into a single framework that can accommod-
ate the diverse range of skill requirements of individuals and employers. This
emphasises ‘seamless’ transitions between the school, VET and higher
education sectors and from one skill level to the next within the VET sector
through accreditation under the Australian Qualifications Framework and
recognition of prior learning. A major component of the development of a
flexible framework was the creation of ‘New Apprenticeships’ in January
1998.
Under the New Apprenticeship System, all trainees are referred to as ‘new
apprentices’. This, one presumes, is part of the rhetoric of the reforms. The
term ‘traineeships’ that was introduced in response to the 1985 Kirby report
never achieved widespread acceptance. An apprenticeship, on the other hand,
has ancient origins and has a high degree of recognition among most sections
of the community. From this perspective, it makes good sense to try to transfer
some of this kudos to traineeships by the adoption of the umbrella term ‘New
Apprentices’. Persons involved in the training sector, however, continue to use
the terms ‘trainees’ and ‘apprentices’ so this nomenclature has been retained in
this paper.
The overriding theme of New Apprenticeships is increased flexibility in train-
ing arrangements – moving from a system that provided a handful of ‘one-
size-fits-all’ training products to one in which the product can be tailored to
the individual needs of each firm. Trainees and apprentices enter into formal
agreements with employers known as ‘Training Agreements’ or ‘Contracts of
Training’. These provide an outline of the training, support and supervision to
be provided by the employer. As stated by the policy-makers, provisions that
increase flexibility are:2
• Subject to mandatory requirements to ensure quality, such as competency
standards, assessment guidelines and the qualification conferred, the
structure of the training (e.g. the timing and mode of delivery of off-the-job
training) is open for negotiation.
• Apprentices and trainees can be paid a ‘training wage’ which can be
adjusted to reflect the amount of time spent in off-the-job training. If this
wage falls below a specified minimum, they may be eligible for a ‘wage top
up’ payment by the Commonwealth Government.
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• Employers have access to public training funds from the State or Territory,
but can choose from any training provider that is a Registered Training
Organisation (RTO).
• New Apprenticeships are to be made available progressively in all major
industry sectors, rather than just in ‘declared trades’ as was the case with
apprenticeships.
• New apprenticeships can be school-based (off-the-job component is
provided through vocational streams in secondary schools) and under-
taken on a part-time basis.
An important implication of these flexibility provisions is that apprentices no
longer need to be indentured for a full four years. A trainee can progress from
an AQF Level II traineeship, to an AQF Level III traineeship and then complete
the equivalent of a trade certificate. New Apprenticeships also potentially
allow employers to improve the cost/benefit outcome. Such mechanisms
include wage trade-offs for offering more off-the-job training; increasing the
proportion of training that is firm specific; concentrating off-the-job training in
the trainee’s lower productivity periods as determined by the firm’s work or
demand patterns or the trainee’s progress; and varying the duration of the
training in accordance with the trainee’s ability or the firm’s needs.
The Case Study Findings
The case studies had two aims. The first was to gather data to calculate
quantitative estimates of the costs of employing and training an AQF level II
trainee and an apprentice. The second aim was to investigate whether the
New Apprenticeship reforms had impacted upon costs and how employers
were utilising the flexibility provisions.  
The methodology for measuring the net cost is the same as used by the authors
in previous studies (Dockery et al. 1997) and is essentially the same as that
used by similar studies in several other countries (Smits and Stromback 2001,
pp. 100-107). Respondents were asked to make assessments of the costs and
benefits of a  ‘typical’ trainee or apprentice. The two main cost components
are the wage cost of employing an apprentice/trainee and the training cost.
The wage cost is a simple matter of recording the wage and on-costs. The
training cost is mainly comprised of the time spent or lost by experienced
workers supervising an apprentice or trainee. This time is valued at the cost of
employing an experienced worker. The principal benefit is the value of the
output produced by the trainee/apprentice. This is measured by asking
respondents to assess the productivity of the trainee relative to an
experienced worker, and valuing the output of the experienced worker at their
wage costs. Although the same or similar methods have been used in all
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studies, reservations about the resulting estimates have been expressed
(Acemoglu and Pischke 1999, Smits and Stromback 2001 pp. 100-101). The
major conceptual issue is the implied assumption that the wage cost of an
experience worker equals the value of their output. This equality only holds in
a perfectly competitive labour market. As regards measurement issues, many
authors have argued that the cost of supervision is overestimated since it can
be scheduled to times when the opportunity cost of supervisors time is low.
A total of 60 case studies were undertaken in four States, New South Wales,
Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. A list of potential respond-
ents was identified with the assistance of the relevant State Government
Department. From these lists firms were selected to give a mix of industries,
occupational groups and firm size that corresponds to the population
distribution of trainees and apprentices.
Trainees
Thirty-four case studies of organisations employing trainees were undertaken.
In four of these, respondents were unwilling or unable to estimate the output
of a typical trainee relative to an experienced worker.  The estimate of net cost
and its main components based on the responses of the remaining thirty firms
is shown in Table 1.  In calculating these estimates the figures for each firm
was weighted by the number of trainees they employed.
Trainees achieve experienced worker productivity after a period of about eight
months and over the 12 months training period their relative productivity is
almost 90 per cent of an experienced worker.  In the table, this is reflected in
the value of trainees’ output ($28,082) being almost as large as their wage cost
($31,844). The Commonwealth subsidy that averaged $896 compensates for
part of this difference. This figure is lower than the nominal initial payment of
Table 1: Costs and Benefits of Employing a ‘Typical’ AQF II Trainee
(weighted average)
Dollars Percentage
Value of output 28,082 97.0
Commonwealth subsidy 896 3.0
Total benefits 28,978 100.0
Wage costs 31,844 88.0
Training costs 4,349 12.0
Total costs 36,193 100.0
Net costs 7,215
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$1,250 since firms that put on existing workers as trainees are not eligible for
this payment. Firms also incur a training cost that amount to $4,349.
Supervision of trainees accounts for about 60 per cent of this figure, the
remainder comprising wastage due to trainee inexperience, administrative
costs and fees to external training providers. Taking all costs and benefits into
account resulted in an estimated net cost of $7,215. However, not all firms
incurred a net cost. There was considerable variation around this average
ranging from a net return of $7,196 to a net cost of $20,287 and with seven of
the 30 firms reporting a net benefit.
What is notable about these figures is the rather high wage costs of trainees.
This reflects the fact that traineeships are no longer a purely entry-level
training system but are also used to formalise the training of existing and older
workers.3 Thus, only 38 per cent of firms paid trainees the national training
wage.  
To complement the quantitative estimates, respondents were also asked for a
qualitative assessment of the costs and benefits of a traineeship. This assess-
ment was more favourable in that 12 of the 30 respondents thought that there
was a net benefit and seven that they broke even by employing a trainee. The
most likely reason for the more positive assessment is that employers take into
account benefits that they derive from trainees staying on even though the
question referred to the training period.  
That some benefits may not be incorporated in the quantitative estimate of net
cost is evident from the responses summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: Factors that Firms Consider a Benefit of Employing Trainees
Factor Percentage of firms
Stronger commitment from persons employed 68
Flexibility in time spent in training 62
Competency rather than time-based assessment 53
Exemption from payroll tax 41
Useful as a screening mechanism 38
Offering traineeships attracts higher quality recruits 29
A difficulty in attracting other recruits 24
Lower wages paid to trainees 21
Trainees can move into apprenticeships 12
Exemption from workers compensation payments 6
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Many of the perceived benefits centered on the quality of recruits and
organisational commitment. For example, it was common for organisations to
use the fact that they employed trainees in their marketing and promotional
material, in an attempt to gain a competitive edge. Often this was linked to
health and safety or to demonstrate a commitment to training and quality
more generally.
Many of the benefits listed above accrue from trainees that stay on with the
training firm. From the responses it was estimated that 83 per cent of trainees
stay on with the firm for an expected average period of four to five years.
There was also evidence that the training has a large firm specific component.
Seventy-five per cent of firms rated trainees who stay on with the firm as more
productive than external recruits. None indicated that trainees were less
productive.  
Apprentices
The methodology for calculating the costs and benefits of apprentices is
identical to that for traineeships. Again, respondents were asked to answer
with respect to a typical apprentice. The relative productivity of an apprent-
ice increases from 21 per cent in the first year to 90 per cent in the fourth year,
which has commensurate effect on the value of their output. In the first year,
the wage cost is only about $15,000 but increases to about $30,000 in the
fourth year. Training costs, as is to be expected, displays the reverse pattern.
First year training costs amount to about $15,000 but are less than $8,000 by
the fourth year. Taking all the costs and benefits into account results in a first
year net cost of $18,807. By the fourth year, the net cost becomes a small net
benefit. Over the full four years, however, it costs an average of $38,329 to
employ and train an apprentice. Only four of the 20 firms showed a net
benefit. At the other end of the distribution, seven firms incurred a net cost
exceeding $60,000.
Table 3: Costs and Benefits of Employing Apprentices by year of
Apprenticeship ($, weighted average)
Year
1 2 3 4 Total
Value of output 10,141 18,782 31,003 38,097 98,023
Commonwealth subsidy 1,234 1,163 229 1,422 4,048
Total benefits 11,375 19,945 31,232 39,519 102,071
Wage costs 15,189 20,095 26,298 30,870 92,452
Training costs 14,993 13,623 11,709 7,623 47,948
Total costs 30,182 33,718 38,007 38,493 140,400
Net cost 18,807 13,773 6,775 -1,026 38,329
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Comparing apprentices with trainees reveals more differences than similari-
ties. Apprentices are, on average, younger and paid the training wage as set
out in the relevant award, although some firms paid bonuses as well. Their
training cost is far higher than for trainees – even during the fourth year the
training cost of an apprentice is higher than for a trainee. They also spend a
much larger proportion of their work time in training as indicated by the low
value of output during the first two years.
When making a qualitative assessment employers were more optimistic. More
than half (12 out of 20) thought that there was a net benefit from training
apprentices, and four that they broke even, even though the calculations
summarised in Table 3 resulted in a net benefit for only four firms. In this
context, it should be noted that the calculations for the quantitative estimates
were returned to the interviewee for validation.  
As with traineeships, other benefits may have influenced employers’ quali-
tative assessment but were not included in the quantitative calculations. In
some sectors, a certain ratio of apprentices to tradespersons is required to
tender for government contracts. Where the firm commands a dominant
market position as an employer, increasing the pool of trained workers may
reduce the wages they need to pay to attract skilled labour. There were also
indicators of firm specific skills being important that might allow the training
firm to recover some of the training cost from apprentices that stay on. A
commonly cited benefit of employing apprentices was being able to ‘train them
the way you want’, and tradespersons trained in-house were perceived to
offer the same significant productivity advantage over externally recruited
workers as was noted for trainees. Finally, many employers convey altruistic
motives for training apprentices, such as a sense of community obligation to
provide apprentice training, or an obligation to ‘keep the trade going’.
The Impact of the New Apprenticeship Reforms
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, the overriding theme of the
New Apprenticeship reforms has been to further increase flexibility. In policy
discussions, flexibility is commonly used as a euphemism for efficiency and
we take it that in plain language the motivation for the reforms is to increase
the efficiency of apprenticeship training by lowering the training costs and/or
improving the training outcome. Furthermore, and even though this has never
been explicitly stated, there is little doubt that it is the cost efficiency to
employers that has been foremost in the minds of the policy makers. In
keeping with this employer-dominated perspective, this paper is exclusively
concerned with the cost and benefits to employers.  
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As regards quantifiable costs and benefits, the finding in this study can be
compared to a previous study by the authors (Dockery et al 1997). In this
earlier study based on interviews with 59 employers, the average net cost was
estimated at $22,800 for a four-year apprenticeship.4 This compares to the
figure of $38,329 obtained in the present study, an increase of 68 per cent. The
composition of net costs, between wage cost, training cost and value of output
over the duration of an apprenticeship was very similar in the two studies.
Since the estimates come from small samples and there are large variations in
net costs between firms, strong conclusions cannot be drawn from this
comparison. However, other findings from the case studies are consistent with
there being no decrease in net costs. Only five of the 26 employers indicated
that the flexibility provisions had improved the cost-benefit outcome, while
four indicated that the outcome had worsened. Furthermore, although 21 of
the 26 employers had used at least one of the flexibility provisions, only six
went on to acknowledge that the changes had affected their organization or
recruitment of apprentices. Many more indicated that they would like to
utilize some of the provisions. Still the overriding impression is that the
reforms, to date, have had very little impact on quantifiable aspects of
apprentice training.
In the case of trainees, there are no previous quantitative estimates of the net
cost. However, several of the other indicators can be directly compared to the
findings in Centre for Labour Market Research (CLMR 1997). Thus, both this
and the previous study found that trainees take about eight months to reach
an experienced worker standard. The relative productivity during the training
period was not directly measured in the previous study but, drawing on other
indicators in the study, appears to have been lower than the 88 per cent in the
present study. Another indicator of an improved cost benefit outcome was the
much lower drop out rate. The qualitative assessments, on the other hand,
suggest that the cost/ benefit has worsened. In CLMR (1997) 49 per cent of
employers indicated that trainees were a net benefit compared to 40 per cent
in the present study.
That the reforms have not impacted on the net cost of training apprentices
does not necessarily imply that they have not had any effect at all. There are
many aspects of training arrangements that cannot be subsumed and quanti-
fied under a cost or benefit heading even though they matter to outcomes.
Thus, the case studies also used a more direct approach to assess the impact
of the reforms by asking employers if they were aware of each of the main
changes that had been put in place, whether they had used the new features
and whether they were likely to adopt them in the future (Table 4).
DOCKERY, STROMBACK, NORRIS & KELLY 201
Table 4: Awareness and use of the Features of New Apprenticeships
(per cent)






Ability to vary time in off-the-job training 69 23 31
Ability to vary wage accordingly 42 15 4
Competency based rather than time based
assessment, so that the time taken to
complete the apprenticeship may vary
88 46 31
Apprentices being able to progress from
traineeships into the apprenticeships
77 38 15
Ability to use private providers rather than TAFE 85 46 12
School-based apprenticeships 77 35 8
The first column shows that there is a high level of awareness of the features
of New Apprenticeships, the second that the degree to which the features
have been adopted is distinctly lower and the third that some features are yet
to be adopted by some firms. Of the features that have been adopted, the
responses by firms indicate that there will be increases in the number of firms
varying the amount of time apprentices spend in off-the-job training and using
competency-based, rather than time-based, assessments.5 Finally, the number
of firms who indicated that they would utilise the feature of apprentices
progressing from traineeships into apprenticeships suggests that this practice
might increase.
Ability to vary time in off-the-job training
One-quarter of employers indicated they had used this provision and a further
30 per cent indicated they were likely to do so. The reasons for the positive
responses can be traced to the ability to schedule off-the-job training to slack
periods. However, there is still a lack of choice among training providers and
it takes time to implement training arrangements to take advantage of this
provision.
Ability to vary the wage according to the time off-the-job training
Employers of apprentices and trainees alike had not much used or did not
intend to use this provision. Using it presumably means reducing the wage in
exchange for more off-the-job training thereby shifting more of the cost onto
the trainees.  In the case of trainees, much of the training can be regarded as
firm-specific and it is not clear that trainees would be willing to pay a larger
proportion of the costs. In addition, as most employers expect trainees to stay
on for quite some time there is no pressing need to reduce the training wage in
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return for a higher post-training wage.  Indeed, many employers put existing
employees through a traineeship without any reduction in pay.
In the case of apprentices, previous studies (Dockery et al. 1997, 1998) have
shown that although there may be a case for apprentices carrying a larger
share of the training costs, employers are reluctant to reduce apprentice
wages. The current relativities between apprentices and tradespersons have
persisted for a long time and have acquired the status of being fair and
equitable. In addition, many employers believe there is a trade-off between the
wage they pay and the quality of apprentices. In view of these previous
findings, it is not surprising that little use has been made of this provision.
Competency-based Assessment and Progression from Traineeship to
Apprenticeship
Competency-based assessment is a difficult to pin down concept. In the mind
of the respondents its meaning was strongly linked to the possibility of a
shorter than normal four year apprenticeship. The large proportion of
employers that had, or intended to use this provision, relate to reductions in
the term of an apprenticeship by the progression from a traineeship into an
apprenticeship. Many employers were very enthusiastic about this feature and
many more would no doubt have used it had it been possible in all
jurisdictions. At the time the fieldwork was undertaken, New South Wales
still operated with a system of declared trades in which juniors can only be
employed as apprentices (or tradespersons, if qualified). This is being
reviewed and changes to the relevant legislation to accommodate New
Apprenticeships are expected. Theoretical considerations and employers’
responses both suggest that traineeships are not being used as probationary
employment before employers commit themselves by offering an apprentice-
ship. Rather, the workers that first go through a traineeship are wanted in their
own right.  Some employers have restructured work to make greater use of
workers with intermediate level skills that previously were not available.
Thus, they take on workers as trainees, who on completion form a pool of
AFQ level II workers from which they recruit the most suitable as apprentices
which releases fully qualified tradespersons from low-value added work.
Ability to use Private Providers rather than TAFE
This provision has always been in place for traineeships, and indeed firms
themselves can become registered training organizations and deliver their own
training in-house. Thus, this provision does not change anything and is in any
case not very important to traineeships where the off-the-job training
component can be quite short. According to some respondents, the training
amounted to little more than a couple of weeks of structured learning by
observing experienced workers. For many firms, the formal component is little
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different from what they would have provided in the way of in-house training
or by sending employees to external courses. This being the case, this provision
can be used to gain recognition and public funding of the training they would
have provided in any case. Saunders (1999, p.46) has expressed concern
about this, viewing it an inappropriate use of public funds.
It has also been possible, at least in theory, for apprenticeship training to be
delivered by private providers for some time. In reality, State training
authorities have had control over approving off-the-job training resulting in
TAFE being the dominant approved provider. The large proportion of
employers that indicated they had used alternative providers (46 per cent)
suggests that the reforms have had a significant impact. However, this figure
seems very large relative to the share of contracted training places held by
alternative providers and must be treated with caution.
Conclusions
This paper has assessed the impact of New Apprenticeship reforms on
employers’ costs and benefits of training trainees and apprentices.
Employers were well aware of the reforms and had used many of the new
features. Overall, they viewed the changes as helpful and constructive to the
way in which they conduct their training. The provisions most enthusiastically
embraced by employers include competency-based assessment and flexibility
in time spent in training. As employers of trainees and apprentices they were
also quite satisfied with the cost/benefit outcome even though they incurred a
net cost, and in the case of apprentices, a substantial net cost during the
training period. Employers of trainees pointed to the stronger commitment
they get from their own trainees. In the case of apprentices, there is a more
complex set of factors that explain why employers are willing to incur the
large training cost. Apart from drawing attention to a few factors, such as
specific skills and being a dominant employer, this issue is not addressed in
this paper.    
To date, however, these positive indicators of the reform process have not
translated into an improved cost benefit outcome for employers. The
comparison with previous findings suggests that the net cost of a trainee has
not really changed. In the case of apprentices, our estimate suggests a
substantial increase in net costs since 1996. However, because of the large
variation between firms and small samples, the extent of change is uncertain.
Taking into account all the information from the present and previous studies,
the most that can be claimed is that the reforms have not reduced the net costs
of employing and training apprentices.
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Endnotes
1 The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the
National Centre for Vocational Education Research and the data collection
was undertaken with the assistance of the National Institute of Labour
Studies and the Melbourne Institute of Economic and Social Research. Views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and should not be
attributed to any of the organisations mentioned.
2 Source: New apprenticeships and user choice’, available on the ANTA
Website http://www.anta.gov.au/ABC/NTF/NewApprent.htm
3 See NCVER (2001) for an extensive review of changes and the present state of
the new apprenticeship system
4 In 2000 prices. The original figure in 1996 prices was $21,800.
5 We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that varying the time in off the job
training and the wage accordingly are intended to be used together. Thus, an
employer who varies one should also vary the other. Note, however, that
only one employer gave apparently inconsistent answers to the two questions.
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